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THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
RiciaAR B. TOLINS
Certain security holding companies fall within the category of investment
companies.' Investment companies have been variously defined 2 but for our
purposes it need only be stated that they are associations, the legal structure
of which will be discussed, in which the investing public pools its funds pri-
marily for the purpose of investment in securities. The professed object of
an investment trust is to enable a number of investors to pool their funds
in order to reap the benefit of intelligent investment in a diversified portfolio.
After an analysis of the structure of investment companies, an attempt
will be made herein to trace briefly something of their history and growth,
showing their importance in the national economic picture, point out some
of the existing evils and abuses, and discuss the Investment Company Act
of 1940 in the light of these evils and abuses and of the Bill,3 which, as
amended, became the Act and took effect November 1, 1940.
For the purposes of preliminary discussion and analysis investment com-
panies may be divided into four classifications :4
1
"The term 'investment trust' has been avoided in the definition and generally in the
report because of its restricted meaning and misleading implications. The great ma-
jority of these organizations are not trusts even in form and those which are trusts in
form are seldom true trusts, for almost invariably the trustee does not possess the
rights and powers of a true trustee nor is he subject to the obligations and liabilities of
such a trustee. The trustee has rather the status of custodian of the securities of these
organizations, with some additional duties of a ministerial nature." Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
pursuant to § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, Part I, Ch. II, p. 19,
n. 10 (hereinafter called the REPORT).
2"A securities company was deemed to be an investment company if more than one-
half its assets, other than cash and U. S. Government securities, consisted of securities
other than U. S. Government securities and securities of subsidiary companies which
were not investment companies." REPORT, p. 19. Section 3 of the Wagner Bill for the
regulation of investment companies (S. 3580) contains a substantially similar definition.
The N. Y. Stock Exchange's "Special Requirements for Listing Investment Trust
Securities" defines investment trusts as "such companies as are engaged primarily in
the business of investing in the securities of other corporations for the purpose of rev-
enue or profit and not in general for the purpose of exercising control." This is a very
inaccurate definition. As will be shown, in many cases the purpose was the exercise of
control.
The Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Stock Exchange
Practices defines an investment trust as "a company, incorporated or unincorporated,
organized to acquire and hold securities in other companies for investment purposes."
SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 333.
No text book definitions are submitted since most contain the professed aims of these
organizations rather than the characteristics thereof. See ROBINSON, INVESTMENT TRUST
ORGANIZATION AND MANAEMENT (1929).
3S. 3580. A Bill to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Investment Com-
panies and Investment Advisers, and for Other Purposes, introduced by Senator Wagner
and known as the Wagner-Lea Bill.
4REPoRT, Part I, Ch. II, Sec. III, p. 22 includes "common or commingled" trust funds
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(1) Management Investment Companies,
(2) Fixed or Semi-Fixed Trusts,
(3) Installment Investment Plans, and
(4) Companies Issuing Face Amount Certificates.
Management investment companies differ from the other types in that no
restrictions, or only limited restrictions, are imposed with respect to nature,
type, and amount of investments which may be made. The usual legal struc-
ture is the organization of an investment corporation under the general
corporation law of the state.5 The rights and obligations of security holders
of these corporate investment companies correspond to those of the holders
of similar types of securities of ordinary corporations.'
A number of management investment companies are in the fbrm of the
Massachusetts -type trusts, that is, the "sponsors" are both settlors and trustees
and the trust indenture names the persons who contribute to the fund as the
cestuis que trust or beneficiaries. The indenture usually provides for the
self-perpetuation of the trustees and places varying degrees of management
and control in their hands. The contributors to the fund are not, of course,
parties to the agreement but by participating they become the beneficiaries
thereof and are bound by its terms and conditions. Whether such a structure
creates a true trust or merely a limited partnership depends on tests which
the courts have established.7 In some instances the courts have even con-
strued these organizations as being, in effect, corporations not validly organ-
ized under state law ;8 and in others where there is a statutory or constitu-
tional provision defining "corporations" as including, for the particular pur-
pose involved, "all associations and joint stock companies having powers and
privileges not possessed by individuals and partners," the courts have treated
them as corporations. 9
as a fifth classification. Since participation therein is not available to the general public
this group is not of interest herein.5Note that they are not organized under any special act as banking and insurance
companies are.
6Common stockholders possess only the right, on dissolution of the corporation, to
participate in the corporate assets after all other claims have been satisfied. STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS (1938) § 201.
Preferred stockholders generally have a preference over common with respect to
payment of dividends and distribution of assets on dissolution. Id. at 409 and 420.
Debenture holders are usually unsecured creditors of the corporation and their claims
have priority over both common and preferred stockholders. Id. at § 92.
Secured bondholders have a lien on specific assets of the corporation and are secured
creditors. Id. at § 91.
7If the trustees are to act as principals and are to be free from the control of the
certificate holders, a trust is created; but if the so-called trustees are merely to be man-
aging agents the agreement constitutes a partnership. 9 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. (1937) 189;
47 C. J. 646, § 20 (22.; Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554 (1925). See
supra note 1.
SCf. Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. .57, 245 Pac. 143 (1926).9Home Lumber Co. v. State Charter Bd., 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 601, noted (1921)
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The management investment "trust" may have more than one class of
capital securities and bonds and debentures with interests similar to those
of corporate security holders.' 0 However, the shareholders are rarely given
the right to vote.
A very few management investment companies are joint stock companies
and an equally small number consist of an agency relationship wherein the
individual contributors to the fund confer substantially a power of attorney
on the management to act as agent in the investment of the moneys con-
tributed. These have no distinct legal entity as investment companies but
constitute in essence combinations of distinct individual interests.'1
There are other possible subdivisions and classifications of management
investment companies into types of investment restrictions, amount of control
over affairs of portfolio corporations, closed-end and open-end management
investment companies, 1 2 leverage and non-leverage management investment
companies13 and others, but only the last two are of any importance herein
and they lend themselves to the discussion without further analysis.
A fixed investment trust is created under the terms of a trust indenture or
agreement entered into between a sponsor 'corporation, usually designated
as the "depositor," a bank or trust company, usually designated the "trustee,"
and the persons who contribute the funds of the trust, known as the "certi-
ficate holders," and who are the beneficial owners of the trust property.
Management is reduced to a minimum because the trust indenture, which is
the controlling instrument, usually specifies not only the securities in which
6 CORNELL L. Q. 348 (business trust held subject to Blue Sky law) ; STEVENS, CORPORA-
TIONS (1938) 40.
'OSupra note 6.
'
1 STEvENS, CoI0oRATIoNs (1938) chs. I and II.
'
2
"Most management investment companies proper and all investment holding com-
panies are of the 'closed-end' type, the type in which no provision is made for redemp-
tion or purchase of shares by the company at approximately their net asset value on
demand of the shareholder." REPoRT, Part I, Ch. II, Sec. III, p. 26.
1s"A leverage company has one or more issues of bonds, debentures, preferred stocks,
or other securities outstanding in addition to common stock. A non-leverage company
has only one class of security outstanding, usually common stock." REPORT, p. 28.
It is relevant to note that in times of rising security prices the increase in the asset
value applicable to the outstanding junior security issues is proportionately greater than
the increase in the total value of all the assets of the investment company, reflecting
what is termed the "leverage" of junior securities. This results from the fact that the
benefit of an increase in income or asset which goes to the senior security holders is
limited to a fixed amount and the balance goes to the junior security holders. Conversely,
in times of declining security prices, the decrease in asset value of the junior securities
in a leverage company is proportionately greater than the decrease in its total assets,
since the junior securities bear all decrease in income and assets before the senior
securities.
As a result of this and by the leverage of the common stock the sponsors and direc-
tors of a certain investment company were able, in four years, to earn for themselves a
profit of 450%, whereas the investors, the public, only profited about 28%o. See REPORT,
Part III, Ch. I, Sec. II, A, 2 (b), p. 12.
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the fund may be invested but also the relative proportion of each security
which may be purchased.
The great majority of fixed trusts are "unit type" and are so termed since
the depositor placed with the trustee, under the terms of the trust agreement,
a specified quantity or unit of securities which went to make up the under-
lying property. Since each unit deposited had to conform to any modification
of prior deposited units, all units were identically composed. The trustee
issued a set number of trust certificates against each unit to the depositor
who, as sponsor company, in turn sold the certificates to the public.
As the name might suggest, the installment investment plans are essentially
devices for the sale of investment trust or investment company securities on
a periodic or installment payment basis. Periodic payment certificates, which
constitute participations in the plan, are the securities which are directly sold
to the public. These certificates in turn represent an interest in underlying
securities which are shares of another specified fixed or management invest-
ment trust or company.' 4 The legal structure is similar to that in the fixed
trust with the certificates which constitute participation in the plan being
issued pursuant to a trust agreement which prescribes the terms of the plan,
its method of operation and the underlying securities, defines the rights and
obligations of the sponsor corporation, and terms the banking institution
"trustee," and the purchasers of certificates "certificate holders."
Face amount certificates are contracts between the corporation which issues
them and the purchaser, whereby in consideration of the payment of certain
specified sums the corporation agrees to pay to the purchaser, at maturity,
the face amount of the certificate, or to pay prior to the maturity, upon
demand and surrender of the certificate, its attained surrender value.
I. HISTORY AND GROWTH1 OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Up to the year 1921 there were comparatively few investment companies.
During 1921-1926 the idea was definitely adopted by some of the larger
financial institutions of the country and the movement began to grow in size
and importance. Statistics show that the movement attained its peak in the
four years after 192615 Savings banks, life insurance companies, trust funds,
security affiliates, fire insurance companies, and particularly holding companies
14An incident of this representation is the double sales load placed on the installment
investor.
15Prior to 1921 - New cos. organized - 40
1921-1926 - " " - 139
1926-1930 - " ". - c. 800
1930-1936 - " " - c. 200
REPoRT, Part I, Ch. III, note 1.
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were influential in fostering the rapidly growing infant.' 6 The economic con-
ditions of the period were conducive to new enterprises17 and the investing
public were given powerful stimuli by the sponsor companies.
The actual selling arguments were many and varied. They are worth
noting here to show the claims made in attempts to further this type of
investment. Growing prosperity and the investment company as a means to
share therein were stressed-but no mention was made of possible loss. The
safety of the investment was constantly repeated and linked up in various
attractive posters and "catch-expressions" with the growth of the United
States. Safety, the investor was told, was ensured by the diversification of
the security holdings of the investment companies (the law of averages pre-
sumably making the plan infallible), by the scientific and expert management
and like investment ability of the management.' 8 Of course the invalidity of
these claims is established by the fact that over a ten year period there was
little, if any, difference between the performance' of these investment com-
panies and that of the common stock index.19 The motivating forces behind
this barrage of sales publicity were the numerous sources of profit and patron-
age to the sponsor company,20 the opportunity for the sponsor company to
use the investment company as a means of acquiring or retaining control of
a particular industrial company and the fact that the large resources of in-
vestment companies, which were usually under the domination of the sponsor
company, served to enhance the latter's financing capacities. On the other
hand it is only fair to point out that the funds so invested must have had a
vitalizing effect on industry in general although it is impossible to determine
the exteAt to which the investment companies actually supplied the needs of
industry during the period.
Major factors in this expansion were leverage, market trading and market
premiums. Yearly sales of these issues increased from almost $400,000,000
in 1927 to over $3,000,000,000 in 1929, total assets increased to over $8,000,-
16 REPORT, Sec. II, B.l1ndices show a steady increase in industrial activity; national income grew from
approximately $58,000,000,000 in 1921 to over $79,000,000,000 in 1926; prices of common
stocks rose accordingly. See INDEX OF THE STANDARD STATISTICS CO., INC., STANDARD
TRADE & SEcUmiTIEs, vol. 88, no. 9, sec. 7, April 29, 1938, p. D-67.
18Some of the larger companies even formed economic councils, advisory boards and
research departments. However, these were short lived.
19H. R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), Pt. Two, Appendix 3, pp. 904-6,
and Supp. V, pp. 933 et seq.20REPORT, Part I, Ch. III, A (2), p. 62 lists "special management stocks, options and
other bonus arrangements, underwriting fees and selling commissions, brokerage com-
missions, benefits from direct dealings with the trust, management fees, custodians fees,
salaries, legal fees, accounting fees, and service charges" as only some of the sources
of possible profit. Certain of these are discussed later under the heading of Abuses andEvils, in fra.
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000,000 and investment companies were literally being formed at the rate of
almost one each business day.21 There was extensive trading activity in
investment company securities on the stock exchanges and over the counter, 22
and it is at least suspected that these were operations designed merely to drive
up the market price.23 By 1929 the securities of investment companies enjoyed
such popularity that they were being sold at a premium above their asset
values. Even the securities of newly organized and untested companies sold
at large premiums, some on a "when-issued" basis, before the actual issuance
of the securities. These premiums were made possible by leverage, 24 extensive
trading, rising market prices, public speculative fever, misleading accounting,
excessive valuation, pyramided systems and combinations thereof.
After 1930, and the stock market collapse, investment companies suffered
most as a result of the very factors which aided their previous expansion,
namely leverage, market trading and market premiums. 25 This period was
marked by the disappearance of a large number of investment companies as
a result of bankruptcies, receiverships, dissolutions and to a certain extent
mergers and consolidations. The organization of new companies declined
sharply.
The decline in the market also afforded sponsors, managers, officers, direc-
tors, and other controlling interests an opportunity to obtain great personal
profit, resulting in substantial losses to the investment companies and thus
the investing public. This was accomplished through a variety of methods
including repurchase of shares,26 transactions induced by conflicting interests, 27
etc. Various small groups were able, with no personal investment, to obtain
control of a number of companies whose total assets were valued at millions
of dollars.28 Also as a result of the market decline investment companies'
securities began to sell at substantial discounts and this in time resulted in
popular disfavor of investment company management. To circumvent this
2 1PxPoRT, Part III, Ch. I, Sec. II, pp. 2, 3 and 4. Also see H. R. Doc. No. 707, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1939), Pt. One, Ch. III, Table I, pp. 57, 30-32, 35 and 36; H. R. Doc. No.
70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess (1939), Pt. Two, Ch. II, Table 16, p. III.22H. R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess (1939), Pt. Two, Ch. IV, pp. 299 et seq.
2 31ZpORr, Part III, Ch. I, p. 14.24H. R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), Pt. Two, Ch. IV, pp. 321-324. In-
vestors in leverage companies were particularly hard hit. Whereas the average dollar
invested in non-leverage companies depreciated to about 21 cents in market price by June,
1932, the average dollar invested in a leverage company depreciated to about 2 cents in
the same time. See snpra note 13.25Sutpra note 13.2 6 REPORT, Part III, Ch. I, pp. 20 and 21.
271d. at 22.
28See infra pages 84 et seq. Also see REPORT, Part III, Ch. I, p. 26; and statement of
A. A. Cook, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking atd
Currency on S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), Part I, pp. 59 et seq. (hereinafter called
Hearings before Subcommittee).
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disfavor sponsor companies organized the fixed or unit type trusts minimiz-
ing management and emphasizing that the shares would not sell at a discount
since the shareholder could redeem his certificates at about asset value. These
had a brief period of popularity, but the restrictions on management and the
underlying securities hampered the sponsor companies, and eventually most
of them were turned into management investment trusts, usually of the open-
end type.2
9
Although there has been a considerable shrinkage since 1929, investment
companies are still an important factor in our national economy. It has been
estimated that one out of every ten investors in the country is a participant
in an investment trust or an investment company.30 It is significant that in
spite of the large percentage of the investing public involved (approximately
1,500,000 individuals) control of each company has been vested and per-
petuated in a very small group.31
II. ABUSES AND EVILS
Before discussing the abuses which have become manifest in the operation
of the great majority of investment trusts it should be stated that there can
be no objection to the inherent nature of investment companies or investment
trusts as such. Properly regulated so as to secure the investing public and
the public at large from the defects which will be pointed out, the investment
trust is a desirable means of investment for the general public. There is no
question that the ordinary investor has neither the time, nor the finances, and
probably not the ability, to become an expert on various types of stocks and
securities. Nor has he alone the finances to invest in a sufficient diversification
of stocks to secure for himself such a minimization of risk as is offered by
the investment company. It is submitted that with an efficient management
whose primary interest is the satisfaction of its fiduciary duty toward the
certificate holders, an investment company can be of valuable service to the
community; but the fiduciary capacity of the trustee or manager must be
stressed. It need hardly be mentioned that many investment companies were
conducted by independent management, and fully disclosed their portfolio,
2 9Hearings before Subcommittee, p. 227; SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF S.E.C. ON FIXED
AND SEnti-FIXED INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1940), pp. 214 and 215.
30H. R. Doe. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), Pt. Two, Ch. V, pp. 369-371.
311d at 398-399. " . . . this control is acquired or retained in the investment company
field either through strategic stock ownership or other control devices such as manage-
ment contracts, voting trusts, special classes of voting stocks, common law trusteeships
or business trusts. Furthermore, small stockholders are unable effectively to exercise
their combined voting power because of the inadequacies of voting machinery, the costli-
ness of conducting a campaign against the existing management, and the smallness of the
individual stakes." RPORT, Part III, Ch. I, Sec. III, p. 33.
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genuinely attempting sound investment of the public's money ;32 but this has
not been the history of the majority of investment companies.
The major abuses which have caused these companies to fall into disrepute
may be grouped as follows:
(1) Removal of funds from control of those who supply them,
(2) Conflicting interests of management,
(3) Pyramiding,
(4) Excessive management charges and hidden fees, and
(5) Management's use of control.
It is important to remember that these abuses are interlocking and usually
exist concurrently; thus, during the discussion of any one, each of the others
should be constantly kept in mind.
Removal of funds from controt of those who sqpply them
The devices employed by promoters and managers of investment companies
to obtain absolute control of the funds range from the .very simple to the
very complex.33 Probably the simplest means employed was the issuance of
the following capital :34
Debentures ............................................ $307,000
First Preferred ........................................ 625,000
Class A Stock, 35,000 shs ............................... 255,000
Class B Stock, 25,000 shs ............................... 250,000
Total Capital $1,437,000
Since the voting power was entirely lodged in the Class B stock the organizers
could, with an investment of only $250,000, completely control a fund of
more than five times that amount.
Nor need the organizers actually put up that amount of money. It is
obvious that control could be gained by only buying a much smaller block
of the voting stock; but the following illustration 35 shows that control may
be obtained with absolutely no investment at all. Issues were:
1,900,000 shs. non-voting stock @ $27 ................ $51,300,000
100,000 shs. voting stock @ $25 ...................... 2,500,000
Total $53,800,000
32The REPORT fails in its duty completely to report the industry by its failure to report
this fact more clearly.33Although actual capital structures of various companies will be used for illustration,
it should not be inferred that the management of those particular companies are or were
practising any of the abuses.3 4The Colonial Bond and Share Company, organized in Delaware.
3 5FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG (1930) 38. Also see REPORT, Part III,
Ch. II, Sec. IV. pp. 115 et seq.
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"As the voting stock was issued to itself, it looks as if the bank got control
of a $50,000,000 fund for $2,500,000. But the statement, issued before any
investments were made, did not give $53,800,000 as the sum obtained from
the sale of the two issues. It read as follows:
1,900,000 shs. non-voting stock ........................ $47,500,000
100,000 shs. voting stock @ $25 ...................... 2,500,000
Total $50,000,000
"The apparent disappearance of $3,800,000 may be naturally explained. '3 6
It is explained that the $3,800,000 was organization expense, that this was
enough to pay for all the voting stock and leave a balance of $1,300,000,
and that in this manner a bank could get control of a $50,000,000 fund
"without putting up a cent-and get it in perpetuity."
Nor was it uncommon for investment companies to be organized with
the bankers taking all or one-half of the common stock as payment for
organizing the trust,37 thus obtaining control with no investment.
The limited scope of this article precludes setting forth the various other,
and more complicated, devices of obtaining control of the fund but they have
already been fully treated elsewhere.38 The illustrations are sufficient to show
that the managers of these funds are obtaining permanent ownership and com-
plete control thereof.8 9
It is true that the very nature of the investment company calls for control
of the fund for the purpose of imanagement by the managers. They must
have full exercise of their discretion to handle the fund to the best advantage,
but it must be remembered that in the exercise of a fiduciary duty the advan-
tage should be that of the fund and the investors-not that of the organizer
or manager. The very nature of the control obtained in most companies shows
that it was not obtained for the purpose of management, and the most casual
glance at the uses made of this control proves the point conclusively.
Specifically, the certificate holders or participants in the trust should be
assured of the power to dismiss an incompetent management and this con-
centration of control has deprived them of that power.
86FLYNN, loc. cit. supra note 35.37For example, the Kidder, Peabody & Company trusts, known as Kidder Participation
Nos. 1, 2 and 3.3 8REPORT, Part III, Ch. II, Secs. I-XI, pp. 115-778; FLYNN, op. cit. upra note 35,
ch. III.
39"A comparatively small number of stockholders has held a substantial portion of
the outstanding voting shares of investment trusts and investment companies. This
concentration of ownership, together with the wide diffusion of the balance of the stock,
has perpetuated the control of dominant personalities and has constituted a factor
contributing to the development and continuance of abuses." REPoRT, Part III, Ch. I,
Sec. III, B, p. 32.
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Conflicting interests of inanagement
The sponsors, or organizers, of investment companies and investment trusts
usually retained management in their own hands and constituted a group of
"insiders" who had obtained control of the fund. This undoubtedly was a
contributing factor in the losses sustained46 since in many instances unsecured
loans, the principals of which were lost, were made" to these "insiders," and
their shares were repurchased at a profit to them but at the expense of the
public shareholders.
The majority of the sponsors are banking and brokerage houses, and again
management and control is entirely in their hands. Reduced to its simplest
terms, this means that as bankers or brokers they have a portfolio of stocks
to sell and as managers of the fund they have money with which to buy
stocks. We need not assume that investment companies are formed solely,
or even mainly, for the purpose of creating a perpetual market for their own
securities, but, whatever the purpose, that is certainly the result.
In view of the fiduciary relationship existing between management and
the shareholders, managers have a clear duty not to deal with themselves as
principals,41 at least not to the detriment of the fund.42 However, there is
no question that the great majority "have not hesitated fo sell their own stock
issues to their trusts' 43 and that the trusts have suffered substantial losses
thereby. 44
If a distinction as to management is drawn between the person of the
manager and the board of directors, conflicting interests are still a problem
since the majority of the directors serve two masters. The boards have been
composed either of persons affiliated with the sponsor or persons affiliated
with the companies in whose securities the fund has been invested. Thus
interlocking directorates are the usual situation.
An instance will illustrate the result. The officers and directors of a sponsor
bank were appointed officers and directors of the investment company. As
usual the investment company had a substantial block of the bank stock, but
the bank was in difficulty and its stock was declining. To whom did these
directors owe the primary duty? As "insiders" they knew how great was
the difficulty of the bank and thus their duty as directors of the investment
company was to sell the bank stock. However, they were also directors of
4OHearings before Subcommittee, pp. 207 et seq.
41At least one company recognized this ppint and its trust indenture prohibited such
self-dealing. Public Examination, Investment Trust Fund A, p. 11486.4 2STEVENS, CORPORAIrONS (1938) § 154. See cases cited infra note 64.
48FLYNN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 64.
44Jd. at 64 and 65. That the common law remedies for these evils are ineffectual is
shown infra page 92.
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the bank and they knew that liquidation of the investment company's bank
stock would accentuate the bank's difficulty. In this case they held the stock
and the investing public suffered a loss of $2,000,000.4'
There is absolutely' no necessity for this situation. No one can deny the
existence and availability of large numbers of capable, disinterested and inde-
pendent persons who can take over the management of these investment
companies. Then, too, there would be room for fair representation of the
investing public on the board of directors.
Pyramiding
The two classic examples of pyramiding are The American Founders
Company 46 and the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation,47 but there are
many others equally complicated.
Goldman Sachs and Company, members of the New York Stock Exchange,
were the sponsors of Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation, an investment
company incorporated in Delaware in December, 1928. One million shares, all
common stock, all with the same voting power, were issued as follows:
100,000 shs. to Goldman Sachs @ $100 ................ $10,000,000
900,000 shs. to public @ $104 ........................ 93,600,000
Total $103,600,000
Of this amount, $100,000,000 was the capitalization of the investment com-
pany and the other $3,600,000 went to the sponsors as fees for organization-
a rather large but not unusual profit.
By September, 1929, the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation had raised
over $326,000,000. By 1932 they had $33,000,000 left, ,a loss of almost 90%.
Although a good part of this loss was attributable to the stock market decline,
it is equally true that a part thereof was attributable to the unnecessary size
of the structure set up. 48 This structure, the complexity of which defies com-
plete explanation or discussion, may best be explained by taking a small part
thereof out of the complete picture.
The Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation branched out in three main
directions, namely (1) The Shenandoah Corporation, (2) Pacific American
Associates, Incorporated and (3) certain insurance, bank and security affili-
ates which were purchased in 1929 dnd may be grouped together. Each of
these three in turn branched into an amazing number of other companies.49
45See Hearings before Subcommittee, p. 221, for names, amounts,, etc.
46See FLYNN, op. cit. mspra note 35, at 43 et seq.; Hearings before Subcommittee, pp.
93 et seq.47See FLYNN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 78-91; Hearings before Subcommittee, pp. 229
et seq.
48Ibid.
49Hearings before Subcommittee, chart entitled "The Goldman Sachs Trading Cor-
poration," facing p. 229.
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The Shenandoah Corporation, before breaking down into these smaller
branches, had two main branches, one of which we shall examine closely as
indicative of its other branch and of the other two major branches of the
original investment company, the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation.
Of the original $100,000,000 raised by the Goldman Sachs Trading Cor-
poration $10,379,900 was invested in Central States Electric Corporation,
another investment company. Central States Electric and Goldman Sachs
Corporation then formed the Shenandoah Corporation, again an investment
company, with an original total capitalization of $62,500,000. Each of the two
organizing companies, by an exchange of stock, retained 40% of the issued
stock. The stock in their own companies which was used as payment was
valued at $52,000,000 and in return they received 4,000,000 shares of Shen-
andoah stock. Thus they paid $12.50 per share, whereas the stock which
was sold to the public was sold for $17.50 per share.
The Shenandoah Corporation then used the money so raised to organize
another company, the Blue Ridge Corporation, still another investment com-
pany, which issued 7,250,000 shares of common stock. The public bought
1,000,000 shares at $20 and the Shenandoah Corporation bought the remain-
ing 6,250,000 at $10. The $62,500,000 was raised by selling Shenandoah pre-
ferred stock to the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation.
To this point almost $170,000,000 of the public's money had been raised
and very little of that amount had been invested productively. Most of it
had been used to create new wells for tapping the public's resources. It had
been at least suggested that the purpose of this expansion of the structure
was not at any time the advancement of the interests of the investment fund,
but that the purpose was the use of the public's funds "essentially to help
Goldman Sachs and Company's banking business."50
To continue with the Blue Ridge Corporation, some of its funds were
invested productively, some were invested in other finance and investment
companies such as the Central States Electric Corporation (which owns 40%
of the common stock of the Shenandoah Corporation which, in turn, owns
over 86% of the Blue Ridge Corporation common stock), the North American
Company, and the American Cities Power and Light Company. Any one
of these would again invest in a number of companies, sometimes obtaining
control, sometimes merely in a small block of stock, and eventually the
bottom of the pyramid would be reached.
50See srupra note 47. Mr. Schenker, Chief Counsel, S.E.C., Investment Trust Study,
read into the record an extract from a letter written to the Goldman Sachs Traditg
Corp. by an analyst describing investment in the Greyhound Corp. as highly speculative
but stating that it would probably eventually prove of value to Goldman Sachs and
Company, the bankers. The investment was made.
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Now presume that one of these industrial companies declared a dividend.
Before that dividend reached the certificate holder in the Goldman Sachs
Trading Corporation a charge for management would be deducted by each
of the investment companies along the line, in this case four, and the Goldman
Sachs Corporation would retain 20%o of whatever reached it, and the balance,
if any, would be handed over to the certificate holder.
It cannot be too strongly urged that there is absolutely no need nor useful
purpose for this pyramiding. It serves neither the public nor industry in
general. There is no sound financial or economic reason for it, and it com-
bines all of the evils which are being discussed. Any person or group of
persons, after forming an investment company, should not be permitted to
form another until they have entirely disassociated themselves from the first,
or until a number of years have elapsedr' so that this pyramiding will be
completely impossible.52
Excessive nuanagernent charges and hidden fees
Management consists of acting as custodian of the fund and providing
expert advice as to what securities to buy and the best time for purchase or
sale. Outside the field of investment companies this is rapidly becoming a
standardized service which a great many banks and trust companies offer
with a charge of 3/ of 1% a year based on the actual market value ofl the
investments. 3 Computed over a period of six years the cost of managing
48 British investment trusts averaged 41/100ths of 17o.54 This would seem
to be a reasonable charge. However, the investment companies in this country
which have been controlled by the sponsor banking companies have retained
those bankers at rates varying from Y8 of 1% quarterly of gross assets at
market value to 20%o of net income.5 5 It is submitted that in any event the
great majority of these charges are excessive and, in the light of what has
51Within one year, six investment companies were organized under the control, di-
rectly or indirectly, of the Goldman Sachs firm.5 2FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG (1930) ch. IX, is an interesting expres-
sion of opinion as to the result of this trend unless arrested.
5SThere are also opening and withdrawal charges of 1% each.
5 4FLYNx, op. cit. supra note 52, at 94.
55Investment Trust Fund A paid its sponsor, Investment Managers Company %/s of
1% quarterly of gross assets at market value, or slightly more than / of 11o a year.
For the year 1926 they paid approximately $49,000 [Reply to the Commission's question-
naire for Investment Trust Fund A, pt. 1, Exhibits B and C (1)]. Although slightly
high, this would certainly seem adequate to meet the expenses of management and pro-
vide at least a reasonable profit. Other sponsor-managers received much higher percen-
tages:
First American Corporation paid First American Management Corporation % of 1%
quarterly plus 10% of the income.
Lehman Corporation pays Lehman Bros. 121/2% of net earnings for management.
Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation pays Goldman Sachs and Company 20% of net
income for management.
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been set out herein as to the services rendered therefor, they are exorbitant.
There is no reason why investment companies should not buy disinterested
expert advice for a very small fraction of what they are now paying. There
is no question as to its availability.
However, these specified management fees are not, in many cases, the only
ones. There are hidden fees which are frequently as large. As has been
pointed out,56 sponsors and' managers can, with only a small, and in some
cases no, investment, obtain, by the leverage of junior securities, or any of
various other devices, a much greater percentage of the earnings and profits
than the investor.
Another method5" is to make no provision for compensation to the man-
agers, and thus on the surface to make investment in the company appear
very favorable. However, there is usually a provision that at any time within
a specified number of years the organizers may subscribe to common stock
at a set figure up to a set number of shares. If the liquidating value of the
common stock goes above the set price, as it usually does, then the organizers
may take advantage of this special concealed profit. These are called purchase
warrants and seem particularly inequitable since it is only after the fund has
become successful and the investor is about to get some return that manage-
ment swoops down and confiscates a large percentage of the profits.
Management's use of control
We are concerned herein with the broader aspects of the concentration of
so much power. For example the Pacific American Associates Incorporated,
through the American Company, owned the American Trust Company with
its 96 branches in the San Francisco district. These banks owned about a
half-billion dollars in assets. The Financial and Industrial Securities Cor-
poration controlled the Manufacturer's Trust Company in New York, with
45 branches and about a half-billion dollars in assets. Pacific American
Associates Incorporated was taken over 100% by Goldman Sachs Trading
Corporation and the Financial and Industrial Securities Corporation was
acquired and dissolved by the same investment company in 1929. Thus
Goldman Sachs and Company, through Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation,
controlled these two widely separated, enormous banking institutions with
assets of almost a billion dollars. 8
It is absolutely no reflection on the ability, honesty, integrity or responsi-
bility of a banking house to state that no house, no matter how responsible
or able, should be permitted such control and power.
56See supra note 13.57Organization of the Blue Ridge Corporation, supra pages 88 and 89.58See =pra note 49.
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It has been almost universally admitted that managements of investment
companies use their control thereof for the advantage of the investment bank-
ing or brokerage houses with which such managements are affiliated.69
The uses made of the complete control exercised by managemefit are per-
haps even better illustrated by the statement of Alfred A. Cook, trustee for
the Continental Securities Corporation, appearing as a witness before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Finance.60 His testimony
also indicated the necessity for the correction of the first listed abuse, namely
the complete control by the managers. Mr. Cook pointed out that the port-
folio of the Continental Securities Corporation was reduced in five months
from $3,300,000 to approximately $50,000, without any substantial decline
in the market, merely because the original management sold out to a new
management and agreed that the then directors would resign and that new
directors, chosen by the new management, would be rotated into office. The
new management was as unsound as the new directors were uninitiate; secu-
rities disappeared from the portfolio, and the public was not apprised of the
facts until much too late.6
There should be some safeguard against the sale of control and the election'
of a new board of directors without any notification whatsoever to the certi-
ficate holders. Even with notice, control is not properly the subject of a sale.
Other minor abuses have been the actual misrepresentations made by the
sponsors and the secrecy which cloaks all the actions of the managers, spon-
sors and directors. These have to a great extent already been remedied
through the authorization by Congress of investigation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the exhaustive work that has been done in the
field by that Commission. Further, in the light of the Securities and Exchange
Acts and the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935,62 it would seem
certain that the requirement of registration of the investment trusts and
investment companies contained in the Act will obviate the possibility of
misrepresentation or secrecy.
As has already been pointed out elsewhere 63 there are available to the
investing public certain common law remedies for some of these abuses.
Others are damnum absque injuria. Thus, it is well established that a fidu-
ciary may not profit at the expense of the object of his duty and therefore
5 9FoWLER, AMERICAN INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1928) 28; Harman, The, Investment Trust
(1929 June Supp.) 85 ScRIBNERs 56; Curtis, Mine Own Usury (1930) 131 NATION 93;
FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG (1930) 33 et seq. See supra notes 47 and 50.6OHearings before Subcommittee, supra note 28.
61Criminal prosecutions of the new, and a civil action against the old management
were subsequently commenced.
r48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78 (1934) ; 49 STAT. 838, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 (1935).
6 3See Legis. (1930) 44 HARv. L. Rlv. 117, 118.
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the share or certificate holders can vitiate the contract and compel the sur-
render of profits if the management was interested adversely to the trust ;64
that the excess over the fair value of services can be recovered if exorbitant
salaries are drawn ;65 and that, if the management obtains shares in the trust
at a nominal price, the shareholders have a remedy.66
That these remedies are, in the very great majority of cases, ineffectual
has been reported by the Securities and Exchange Commission. There are
a number of reasons for this ineffectuality, among them the wide scattering
of certificate holdings among small security holders,67 the cloak of secrecy
which surrounds most transactions thereby keeping the shareholders in
ignorance of the abuses or at least making them difficult of proof, the expense
of costly litigation, the power of management, disappearance of wrongdoers,
financial instability of defendants, settlement of actions commenced by indi-
vidual stockholders, and many others.68
Thus it would seem that, in accordance with the views of almost all the
impartial writers, committees and commissions, 69 there was an urgent need
for statutory regulation. State regulation has been, and necessarily must be,
inadequate. 70 The real need was for federal legislation.
III. Tn, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACr OF 1940
The Investment Company Act is aimed to remedy just such abuses as
have been discussed without unduly disrupting existing contractual relations. 71
64Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209 (1921);
Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 651, 26 L. ed. 509 (1880) ; U. S. Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. South Atlantic Dry Dock Co., 300 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 5th
1924); STEVENS, COaRORATIONS (1938) §§ 142 and 143.
65 Carr v. Kimball, 153 App.- Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd,
215 N. Y. 634, 109 N. E. 1068 (1915).
Quaere whether by analogy the excess could be recovered where exorbitant manage-
ment fees are charged.6 6 STEvNs, COR'ORATIONS (1938) § 143, at 572.
67... who were virtually powerless to exercise any concerted effort to prevent or
eliminate various malpractices and deficiencies, or to remove incompetent or dishonest
management." REPORT, Part III, Ch. I, Sec. III, A, p. 32.
6 5See Legis. (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 117, 118; Flynn, Let's Regulate the Investment
Trust (1940) 102 NEw REPUBLIc 505.6 9 Ottinger, Albert, Attorney General, Investment Trusts-A Survey of thr Activities
and Forms of Investment Trusts with Recommendation for Statutory Regulation by the
New York Department of Law (1927) and Supplementary Survey (1928) in KEANE,
MANUAL OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1928) 651 et seq., 741. See also (1928) 16 I. B. A. A.
BULL. 93; Report of the Committee on Investment Trusts of National Association of
Security Commissio ers in ROBINSON, INVESTMENT TRUST ORGANIZATION AND MANAGE-
MENT (1929) 572-82; KEANE, o#. cit. supra at 1608-20; FLYNN, INVESTmENT TRUSTS
GONE WRONG (1930); Legis. (1930) 44 HARv. L. Rav. 117; Flynn, Let's Regulate the
Investment Trust (1940) 102 NEw REPUBLIc 505.7OLegis. (1930) 44 HARV. L. REV. 117.
71Provisions exempting contracts which were operative on or before March 15th,
1940 are numerous. See in particular 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 80a-4 (c) (10), 80a-4 (c) (15),
80a-21 (b) (1940).
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Section 4 classifies investment companies as face amount certificate com-
panies, unit investment trusts and management investment companies. The
main discussion herein has been of management companies and the con-
sideration of the legislation will, in general, be similarly limited. Face amount
certificate and unit type companies are defined substantially as they already
have been above, and management investment companies are defined so as
to include all other types. For the purposes of registration and disclosure to
the public, Section 5 subclassifies management investment companies into
open-end and closed-end companies and into diversified and non-diversified
investment companies.
The qualification of a diversified investment company is that, as to 757
of its cash and securities assets, it must not invest more than 5% of its assets
in the securities of any other one company and may not own more than 10%
of the outstanding voting securities of that company.72
Section 8 (b) (1) provides that investment companies must register as
within one of these classes and subclasses, and Section 13 provides that
investment companies may only change their subclassification or their funda-
mental management policy by vote of a majority of the outstanding voting
securities.
This division into subclassifications and registration thereunder provides
notice to the investing public of the type of investment which will be made
by a particular company.
The first-mentioned abuse was the removal of funds from the control of
those who supply them. It was pointed out that senior securities, without
voting power, were issued to the investing public whereas all or a controlling
block of the voting common stock was retained by the management. In this
connection it was also pointed out that by leverage of the junior securities
the- management could realize enormous profits while the public shareholders
received a comparatively minute profit. 73
Section 18 of the Bill provided that, with certain exceptions, all future
stock issues were to be of common stock without any preference, with equal
voting power, and with the right to purchase ratably the stock of any new
72The Wagner-Lea Bill, S. 3580, further qualified a diversified investment company
as one (a) whose portfolio turnover does not exceed 150% in one year, (b) which is a
non-leverage company and (c) which does not own or control any voting stock of an-
other investment company, and further subdivided non-diversified companies into securi-
ties trading and securities finance companies, a securities trading company being one
which met qualification (a) and a securities finance company being any other manage-
ment investment company.
It is submitted that these further qualifications and subclassifications would have
better apprised the investing public of the investment policy of each management invest-
ment company.
73 See in particular supra note 13.
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issue, and provided for redistribution, on application to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, of existing voting rights aftei two years from the
date of the enactment of the Bill.
This provision, although it would unquestionably have remedied the abuses
named, raises the constitutional question of the right of Congress to delimit
the type of security which a prospective investor might purchase and to
interfere with existing rights of security holders, and also the question of the
advisability of so broad a delegation of authority to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Probably for these reasons Section 18 of the Act does not attempt to limit
the classes of stock which may be issued, but limits the issue or sale of senior
stock securities of an open-end company by certain regulations as to asset
coverage, dividends, right of such shareholders to elect minority directors,
and others. Clearly, the Act does not, in this respect, offer the investing
public as adequate protection against complete voting control by manage-
ment as would the provisions of the Bill. The seriousness of this defect in
the attempt to remedy existent abuses by legislation becomes obvious in the
consideration of Section 16 hereinafter.
Where the public investors have acquired voting stock their voting rights
are protected by Section 20 which places certain limitations on the soliciting
of proxies and prohibits voting trusts.
Further provision delimiting the control of management and provision for
a degree of control by the investing public is made in Section 15. Subdivision
(a) states that investment advisers must be under a contract approved by
a majority vote of the holders of voting securities. Further, this contract
must clearly state the compensation, must be for only a two year period,
may only be renewed with the annual approval of a majority of such security
holders, must be terminable on 60 day notice by the board of directors or
by a majority of the shareholders, and must automatically terminate on
assignment. Sedtion 15 (b) requires that contracts with principal underwriters
be for a maximum of two years, be non-assignable and renewable only by
the annual approval of the board of directors or a majority of the security
holders, and Subdivision (c) requires the approval by a majority of the
disinterested directors or stockholders of any contract with an investment
adviser or principal underwriter.
It is possible that even these provisions, when read in conjunction with
Section 10 of the Bill, would effectually serve the declared public policy of
reserving to the investors a reasonable degree of control over management
without hampering the efficient conduct of an investment company's business
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by that management. But, again, the provisions of Section 10 of the Act
differ widely from those of Section 10 of the Bill.
Section 10 deals with affiliations of directors involving conflicts of interests.
Here, for reasons already pointed out, investment bankers and brokers are
in a special class and both the Bill and the Act have recognized this fact.
The Bill contains several separate regulations appertaining thereto. Sub-
sections (f) and (g) protect against self-dealing by investment bankers and
brokers, subsection (c) provides that an investment banker or broker may
only be a director, officer, or manager of one investment company, and sub-
section (e) (2) provides that an investment banker or broker may not be a
director or officer of an investment company if he is a director or officer of a
corporation whose securities that investment companj has purchased. It
should be noted that this last subsection prohibits such persons from becom-
ing a director of any type investment company whereas subsection (e) (1)
prohibits a director of an industrial company in whose securities a diversified
investment company has invested from becoming a director of that invest-
ment company. 74
The distinction between investment bankers as directors and other direc-
tors of issuing corporations is, of course, justified by the history of the
investment company field. But, in a provision intended to prevent conflicts of
interests on the part of directors, the distinction between investment com-
panies which do not own more than 5% (or 10%7 as provided in the Act)
of the securities of an issuer and those which own larger blocks of stock is
a little more difficult to comprehend. It was understandable that the Bill
should clearly subclassify management investment companies into those which
did not own more than 5% and those which did, and, further, should care-
fully avoid any attempt to legislate out of existence the investment companies
which choose to invest in large blocks of the stock of a particular company.
All that is required is registration and full disclosure of that fact to the
investor. However, here there is a completely different problem. It would
seem that there is certainly no more, and probably less, reason for allowing
common directors in the case of the investment company which owns a large
block of stock. The only possible justification for the distinction would be a
desire to .secure a board of directors for a diversified company which has no
particular interest in any one industrial company and thus will fairly "diver-
sify" the portfolio. The same result could have been achieved by prohibiting
directors of issuing companies frbm becoming directors of any type invest-
ment company.
74These two subsections would effectively deal with the abuse illustrated supra note
45 and text thereto.
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Section 10 of the Bill also provided: subdivision (a) (1), that only a
minority of the board of directors may be affiliated with the manager or spon-
sor of the investment company, and, subdivision (d), that the same person
may only be an officer or manager of one investment company.
Admittedly this section of the Bill is stated so confusingly and worded so
complicatedly that it is extremely difficult to comprehend or interpret, and
thus should have been reworded.
Section 10 of the Act, however, is not merely a rewording of the provisions
of the Bill but a new section providing in effect that: first, only 60o of the
board of directors of an investment company may be affiliated with that com-
pany (as opposed tQ the minority allowed by the Bill) ; second, a director or
officer of the company may not serve as broker or principal underwriter if a
majority of the board are brokers or underwriters, as the case may be; third,
no investment company may have as director, officer or employee an invest-
ment banker if a majority of the board are investment bankers; and, fourth,
a majority of the board of directors may not be officers or directors of any
one bank (as opposed to the Bill provision absolutely barring interlocking
directorates and resultant conflicting interests). The Act completely omits
the provisions found in the Bill that only a minority of the board may be
affiliated with any other one company, and that the same person may only
be an officer or manager of one investment company.
The omission of the latter provision is perhaps justified in that it is harsh
to prohibit a person, no matter how able, from serving more than one com-
pany. It is submitted, however, that the omission of the former provision
and the changes made in the rest of the Section have gone far toward de-
feating the entire purpose thereof, namely, the prevention of the known abuse
of interlocking directorates and conflicting interests of management.
Self-dealing, loans to insiders, and repurchase of shares from insiders,
which were mentioned herein as the other abuses resulting from the conflict-
ing interests of management, are adequately dealt with in Sections 17, 21,
22 (a) and 23.
There have been many instances of self-dealing or loans to insiders by
management which were the basis of a civil action by an individual share-
holder. Of course the amount of damage to any one shareholder was negli-
gible, thus the directors would settle that action as soon as it was com-
menced in the hope that none of the other shareholders would learn of it."
Section 33 adequately provides for this type of situation.
In the discussion of the abuse of pyramiding it was stated that sponsors
or promoters of one investment company should not be permitted to form
75Hearings before Subcommittee, Part I, p. 210.
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another until they have disassociated themselves from the first company, or
until a number of years have elapsed. This is exactly the position taken by
the Bill in Section 11 (a) and (b). True, because of the separation into
two subsections, there is a certain ambiguity. Subsection (a) provides that
a promoter who forms an investment company may not be an officer, director,
manager, etc. of that company if he has formed a previous one within the
preceding five years. As worded this would mean that even a promoter who
forms a company and then entirely disassociates himself therefrom would not
be permitted to form another for five years. It is submitted that this am-
biguity did not justify the complete disappearance of the section from the
Act and the substitution of a provision dealing with exchanges of securities.76
Thus, in spite of a clear declaration of policy against pyramiding,77 the most
effective provision against that evil has been omitted and a safeguard against
one of the occasional minor incidents thereof has been substituted.
Sections 12 (d) and 14 also deal with the probldn of the size of invest-
ment companies. The former provides certain limitations on the purchase
by one investment company of the securities of another investment company.
In view of the policy throughout the legislation not to substitute the dis-
cretion of Congress or the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
discretion of management, that is, not to tell managers how to run these
companies, the draftsmen were reluctant to delimit in any way the securities
in which an investment company may invest its fund. Thus, there is no
requirement, as there is in the case of savings banks and life insurance com-
panies, that they must invest in legals. Lacking such a requirement, it would
seem that there should be some limitation on the size of the companies, i.e.,
the maximum amount which any one investment company should have to
invest, particularly in view of the absence of such a prohibition against pyra-
miding as was contained in Section 11 of the Bill. Such a provision, although
possibly arbitrary, would be justified by the fact that the largest investment
companies have sustained the largest proportionate losses.78
The provision advocated would not delimit the amount which might be
earned, but the limitation would be placed on the issue of new securities to
76 Section II provides that an open-end investment company may only exchange the
securities of its company for the securities of another open-end company on the basis
of the net asset values of the respective securities.77Section I, Findings and Declarations of Policy: ... the national public interest and
the interest of investors are adversely affected . . . (4) when the control of invest-
ment companies is unduly concentrated through pyramiding."78For example:
Goldman Sachs Trading Corp. - $326,000,000 to $40,000,000
United Founders - 500,000,000 to 40,000,000
Central States Electric Corp. - 134,000,000 to 15,000,000
Insull Utilities Invest. Co. - 250,000,000 to 33,000,000
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raise capital when the company already has a named allowed sum, or more,
of working capital. Thus an investment company could start with the named
sum permitted management investment companies and increase its total
assets to any amount by wise investment and resultant earnings, but the
enormous structures created by Goldman Sachs, or by United Founders or
by Insull could not have been repeated.
In spite of the obvious advantages of such a limitation on size, the section
entitled "Size of Investment Companies" (§ 14) not only does not put a top
figure on size but approaches the problem from exactly the opposite point of
view and provides for a minimum net worth of an investment company be-
fore it may make a public offering of its securities. This would not seem
to be in furtherance of the declared policy against pyramiding.
On the other hand,,subdivisions (c) and (d) of Section 20, which prohibit
cross-ownership of voting securities and circular ownership of any securities,
are clearly in furtherance of such policy. It is regrettable that there are no
other, bolstering, provisions.
The Act contains certain provisions aimed to meet the abuses herein
called "excessive charges for management" and "hidden fees," but here again
its provisions leave something to be desired. Section 18 (d) prohibits the
issue of purchase warrants except ratably to a class of shareholders, and pro-
vides that they must expire after four months; Section 22 (b) prohibits the
sale of redeemable securities to an underwriter or dealer at a discount except
in accordance with certain rules; and Section 22 (c) gives the Commission
power to prevent or remedy exorbitant sales loads. This is excellent so far
as it goes, but a clear statement of permissible bases of management com-
pensation would more effectually preclude excessive charges, and, further,
there is no regulation as to the unreasonably large percentage which xnost
investment companies are now paying for "management."
Throughout this article the position has been taken that it is of utmost
importance that the shareholders or participants in the trust have some con-
trol over management, that they have some protection against a complete
change of management personnel without their knowledge and approval, and
that they be assured of the power to dismiss an incompetent management.
Section 16, which provides that directors must be elected by a majority of
the voting security holders, would tend to assure the desired control and
protection if an accompanying section, relating to stock issue, would insure
to the investing public a reasonable percentage of the voting stock. But, as
was pointed out above, Section 18 in dealing with stock issue did not adopt
the prohibition against the issue of more than one class of stock which was
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embodied in the Bill. Thus, the possibility of "insiders" retaining the voting
stock and electing "insiders" as directors remains a potential evil.
Other safeguards contained in the legislation are: Section 12, prohibition
of margin purchases, authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to
regulate short sales and dealing in and distribution of own securities; Section
19, requirement of disclosure of sources of dividends and prohibition of divi-
dends unless there would remain certain prescribed asset coverage for the
remaining securities; Section 32, requirement of financial statement certified
by a public accountant chosen or approved by the security holders. 79
In order to avoid rigidity and inflexibility and for the purpose of enforce-
ment, the Securities and Exchange Commission is empowered to issue rules
and regulations and to enforce certain penalties for non-compliance. 80 Pro-
vision is also made for appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
from such orders and findings of the Commission.8 ' In short, the mechanical
operation of the Investment Company Act will be substantially similar to
that of the Securities and Exchange Act and the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is submitted that the regulation of the purchase by one investment com-
pany of the securities of another investment company, regulation of ex-
change of securities, and prohibition of cross-ownership and circular owner-
ship, without a prohibition against recurrent promotions and a limitation as
to permissible size such as that advocated herein, will not remedy the evil
of pyramiding nor completely eliminate the possibility thereof. It is con-
ceivable, however, that this defect will be remedied by the rules and regula-
tions promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in further-
ance of the declared policy against pyramiding.
Although certain constructive criticisms of the Investment Company Act
have been offered herein, there should be no implication that the Act has
failed in its purposes. The very fact that regulatory legislation has been
enacted and an administrative commission empowered to "police" the indus-
try in the interests of the investing public is in itself a real and substantial
safeguard to that public. In spite of the fact that little if any control has
been shifted from the hand of tne managers to the participants in the invest-
ment trusts, the management's use of that control can no longer be self-
serving; hidden fees for sponsors and managers are no longer possible;
sound accounting and business practices, reputability of management and
7"9Aso see §§ 30, 31, 34 and 35. 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 80a-30, 31, 34, 35 (1940).
8
oSee §§ 38-42, 48, 49. 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 80a-38-42, 48, 49 (1940).
SlSection 43. 15 U. S. C. A. § 80a-43 (1940).
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financial stability of the investment company at the time of the issue of new
securities are assured; protection against the issuance of new securities with
discriminatory provisions is provided to the holders of outstanding securities;
and regulation of the issuance of senior securities operates as protection
against the leverage of junior securities.
It is difficult to see how regulations providing such a setting for investment
companies add to "the mountain of laws, rules, regulations, releases and
bulletins which constitute ever increasing barriers to the free flow of capital. '8 2
It would rather appear that such a setting would itself be an inducement to
investment and thus increase and expedite the free flow of capital.
8 2 Statement of F. Eberstadt, Hearings before Subcommittee, Part II, p. 257.
